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Mortgages to Secure Future Advances.
Introduction-- It has been for some time a well settled
principle of law that Mortgages to secure future advan-
ces or liabilities are equally as binding and valid,
if made in good faith and free 'rom fraud, as those
made to secure a past or present indebtedness.
Their. adoption and extensive use have been the out-
growth of the requiremrents of trade and their special
adaptation to business transactions.
They have become a recognized form of security
throughout the United States, except perhaps in a very
few states where statutes have been passed forbidding
or restricting their use.
Parties are enabled by this means to arrange for
prospective dealings, the ultimate character and scope
of which cannot be known or estimated at the time of
entering into the agreement, and securities of this na-
ture avoid the necessity and expense of preparing new
articles of agreement for each separate dealing.
It is not unusual for a person who contemplates
entering into some project that will entail the
investment of considerable capital, to mortgage his
property to his creditors as a security for debts to
be contracted, as well as for those already due, and by
so doing insure the payment of legitimate obligations.
Mortgages made in good faith, for the purpose of
securing creditors, have been generally sustained both
in early and recent cases by reason of their fairness
and consistency with comnon usage.
There is a great diversity of opinion with respect
to the subject of future advances, but this lack of har-
mony does not exist because of any question regarding
the validity of such mortgages in general, but for the
following reasons, viz.:
1. Whether or not the nature of the subject iratter
and the definite, amount to be secured should be express-
ed on the face of the instrument.
2. Whether such a mortgage is to take precedence
over the subsequent liens of creditors, purchasers and
incumbrance-s,for advances made after such subsequent
liens have attached.
In some states it is held to be essential to the
validity of such a mortgage that it should expressly
and distinctly specify on its face what it secures, so
that it would be unnecessary for a stranger to seek be-
yond the mortgage to ascertainaliunde, the required in-
f orma t i on.
Again, we find many courts holding directly to
the contrary.
Others have held that a mortgage for future advances
to be made or liabilities to be incurred, when duly re-
corded, is valid and enforceable for all indebtedness
entailed on the strength of it before actual notice of
the supervening rights of third persons. Then again
many eminent judges have held merely constructive notice
to be adequate.
The latter views have been qualified and a distinc-
tion made between mortgages, on the one hand, where the
constituent part of the agreement is the binding con-
tract by which the mortgagee is bound to make and the
mortgagor to accept such advances, wholly unaffected
by any change of circumstances, and the other class,
which is optional to the parties interested, whereby
there is no obligation on the one side to make and the
other to accept such advances.
The most important class of mortgages to secure
future advances is where the future advances arranged
for at the time of giving the security are designated
or designed by both parties to be made, provided the
general status of the parties remains unchanged, but
where nevertheless it remains optional with both the
mortgagor and mortgagee to put an end to their business
relations whenever such a course is deemed advisable,
sometimes by definite notice to that effect, or by simp-
ly treating their agreement as to future advances in
the light of a nullity, and of no binding force.
Under this category we can include by far the great-
er number of cases ranged under the general denomination
of mortgagees to secure future advances, and th-ey in a
great measure embrace that class 'which is practically
important to the commercial world.
It will be here attempted to present the leading
features of this subject in as concise and lucid a man-
ner as possible, and in order to do so in something
like a systematic way the subject will be treated under
the following heads, viz.;
5I. Whether the purpose of a mortgage to secure
future advances should be stated on its face ;
II. What evidence independent of the deed is ad-
missible to interpret and explain the terms of the agree-
ment ;
III. whether or not the utmost limit of the lien
should be specified
IV. As to what notice is sufficient to charge the
mortgagee with knowledge of the rights of a subsequent
incuirbranc er.
I. W1hat language in the deed itself is necessary
and sufficient to create such a security ?
There is some little conflict among the authorities
regarding the necessity of stating the purpose of the
arIreemnent upon the face of the instrument, and numerous
cases could be cited holding that the omission to state
fully and clearly the object would in itself be suffi-
cient to render the mortgage invalid for the purpose
for which it was executed : but the more moderate and
reasonable doctrine, and that which is accepted by
the great preponderance of authority, is, that where
there is a definite and determined ainount expressed in
the instrunent, which the mortgage is given to secure,
there would seem to be no imperative need for stating
whether the amount so specified was to cover a past in-
debtedness or for the purpose of obtaining future advan-
ces.
Some writers have endeavored to draw a distinction
between the principle of making a mortgage to be a se-
curity for subsequent advances as between the parties
themselves, and that of giving it the same extended ap-
plication when employed against third persons.
Though the mortgage need not necessarily express
that it was given as security for advances to be made
or liabilities to be incurred by future endorsements,
still the extent of the lien intended to be created
should be described with a reasonable degree of certain-
ty ; but the condition need not be so definite as to
preclude the necessity of extraneous inquiry---it is
sufficient if enough is stated so that by exercising
7ordinary prudence and diligence in consulting the mort-
gagee the nature and amount of his incunbrance can be
ascertained and all requisite information gained ; so
that there can be no justifiable reason for establishing
a different principle of law for the guidance of third
persons holding other liens upon the-estate,72 that
applied to the parties to the instrument themselves.
Though it is not necessary that the mortgage should
express on its face the objec for which it is given,
still it would be better to state such object in the
mortgage, as such omission, though not affecting the
validity of the instrument, renders it liable to suspi-
cion and imposes upon the mortgagee much stricter proof
of the payment of the consideration than if such pur-
pose had been clearly and definitely stated.
The form of the security varies considerably and is
governed by the attendant circunstances of each case,
but the general rule of law is now perfectly well settled
that a mortgage to secure future advances may be given
in the form of a gross sum expressed on the face of the
instrument, as representing a present indebtedness
and as it frequently happens that this indebtedness
8arises out of complicated transactions, where it would
be exceedingly difficult if not absolutely impossible
to describe the securities or the debts except in this
general way, such a description will be deemed sufficient
as against subsequent incumbrancers, purchasers and
creditors.
What more could rightfully be reqiuired of the prior
mortgagee than that he should give the subsequent in-
cumbrancer fair and reasonable notice of the utmost pos-
sible ainount of his lien ? Should the supervening in-
cumbrancer feel disposed to do so, he could readily as-
certain from the mortgagee the exact amount of his claim
within the mnount specified in the mortgage, or should
he feel so inclined, he could treat the mortgage as se-
curity for the whole ainount named. In either case he
could not possibly suffer any injury. The prior mort-
gage in any event is only a lien for the actual amount
of the indebtedness existing between the parties at the
particular time, and it cannot make an possible differ- ,/
ence to the incumbrancer whether such indebtedness ex-
isted at the time of the execution of the mortgage,
or was created by subsequent advances.
It is to be observed with no small degree of satis-
faction that the courts have exhibited a commendable
disposition to recognize any form of security which was
executed in good faith and relied upon at, and subse-
quent to, the time the advances wore made.
In a leading Anerican case upon the subject :
Shirras vs Caig 7 Cranch 64. A mortgage given presumably
as security for 30,000 pounds sterling, but with the
real purpose of securing various debts existing and
due at the time from particular mortgagees, advances
afterwards to be made and liabilities to be incurred to
an uncertain amount ; the security was held valid as
against future incumbrancersand creditors even as to
future advances made before notice of any intervening
equity.
A mortgage To secure suns due and to become due
held sufficient.
Insurance Co. vs Brown 11 Mich. 266.
The following was held to be sufficient "to secure
all past indebtedness due and owing."
Machette vs Wanless 1 Col. 225.
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"Vhat I may owe him on book" was construed to mean
future accruing accounts after it was ascertained that
there was nothing owing at the time.
MJcDaniels vs Colvin 16 Vt. 300.
A mortgage for the payment of such sums of money
as the mortgagee might advance in pursuance of an agree-
mnent mentioned in the condition of a certain bond given
by the mortgagee to the mortgagor of even date, contains
reasonable notice of the incumnbrance.
Crain vs Deming 7 Conn. 387.
Mix vs Cowles 20 Conn. 420.
When it has been shown that the mortgage was given
in whole or in part as security for future advances,
the burden of proof rests upon the mortgagee to show
the amount which has been advanced.
The next question to be considered is :
II. Yhat evidence independent of the deed itself
is admissible to interpret and explain the terms of the
agre ement ;
It is a general rule that parol evidence cannot
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be given to deny or contradict a written contract, but
to this rule there are some exceptions : e.g. It has been
held in many cases that parol evidence can be given to
contradict or explain a mere receipt,and this principle
has long since been extended to the acknowledgement of
the payment of the consideration as represented in a deed
And again the occurrences are very frequent where parol
evidence is amitted, not to vary or contradict a writ-
ten contract, but to indicate and explain the purpose
and intent for which it was executed :e.g. Where evi-
dence is admitted to show that a deed, absolute upon
its face, was intended merely as a security for money.
The authorities seem to agree almost universally
that when a mortgage has been made to secure an existing
debt or liability, parol evidence is admissible to prove
the identity of the debt or obligation intended to be
secured by the parties, and the fact that such evidence
differs materially from the written description in the
deed, would not affect the competency of such evidence.
Therefore where a mortgage expresses on its face that
it is given as security for a certain, fixed sum of
money, it may be shown that its purposo was to secure
advances which were to be made subsequent to the execu-
tion of the instrument, and the fact that the agreement
to make and accept such advances was made verbally, will
not be detrimental to the rights of the mortgagee. This
conclusion is reached from the fact that supervening
purchasers or incumbrancers must have consulted the
records and therefore could not have been ignorant of
the fact that the prior mortgagee had a claim on the
property mentioned as security, and such knowledge must
naturally have been obtained before giving credit ;
therefore there seems to be no valid r'eason why the
mortgagee should not have priority to the full extent
of advances made and liabilities incurred according to
the terms of the agreement ; providing -uch claim does
not exceed the amount specified in the mortgage.
Chancellor Kent 4 Kent's Commentaries 176,says :
"So a mortgage or judgment may be taken and held as
"a security for future advances and responsibilities
"to the extent of it, when this is a consistent part
"of the original agreement, and the future advances
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"will be covered by the lien in preference to the
"claim of the junior intervening incunbrancer with
"notice of the ag4reement."
III. Another fruitful field of discussion is the
question as to whether or not the utmost amount of the
lien should be specified in the mortgage.
The decisions on this point are equally as conflict-
ing as those bearing on the necessity of expressing the
purpose of the agreement.
In a number of cases it has been held that where a
mor tgage expresses on its face that it was executed
for the purpose of securing future advances, it is essen-
tially necessary that it should also state the ultimate
extent of such advances ; otherwise it would be invalid.
Pettibone vs Griswold 4 Conn. 158.
Garber vs Henry 7 Wfatts 57.
The great weight of authority,however, at the pres
ent time tends the other way, and with the exception of
a few states the courts strongly favor the opposite
theory ; that where a mortgage expresses on its face
that it is to secure furture advances the utmost limit
of such advances need not be expressed.
Robinson vs Williarns 22 N Y. 680.
Witczinski vs Everman 51 M.iss. 841/846.
1 Jones on Mortgages 367 and note.
If the mortgage contains enough to show an agree-
ment that is to be regarded as a security to the mortga-
gee for such subsequent dealings as may- be entered into
by the party, it will be sufficient warning to put a
future purchaser or creditor upon inquiry, and if he
should fail to exercise due diligence and ordinary pru-
dence in making the investigation, he cannot claim the
equities of a bona fide purchaser.
With our present system of recording, a mortgage,
innediately on being filed, becomes a notice to the
world of its contcnts ; until discharged it stands as a
security for all indebtedness which it covers, accruing
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. A person consult-
ing the record is put upon inquiry to ascertain the
amount of the liability which the mortgage was given to
secure ; having been advised of the claims of the mort-
gagee, it would, under the circumstances, be folly on
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the part of a third person to voluntarily buy or accept,
as security, a deed of the mortgaged property.
The senior mortgagee having secured himself by a
mortgage which, on being duly recorded, recited facts
sufficient to give supervening incumbrancers reasonably
fair means of ascertaining fall infonnation regarding
the extent of his claims, such subsequent incuinbrancers
would be subordinated to the paramount rights of such
prior mortgagee.
There have been strong expressions of disapproval
by some writers claiming that a mortgage not stating
the utmost limit of the prospective advances conflicts
with and defeats the main purpose of our registry laws,
and that instead of the record serving as a guide to
subsequent creditors or purchasers by making known the
real transaction, it contravenes and leads them astray
by purporting to show what it does not do in effect.
Many persons seem to have a very erroneous idea as
to the object and purpose of the recording acts. When
the idea of the recording of written instrunents was
first conceived, it was most assuredly never intended by
the leg:islature that the register should show the actual
ainount due from time to time upon a mortgage, and the
idea which was then formulated has not, that I can dis-
cover, undergone any change in this particular. A mort-
gage may be half paid a week after it is executed, and
so only half the amount be due upon it as it stands
upon the record, or it may be a mortgage of long stand-
ing with a considerable accumulation of interest upon
it, so that the amount is much larger than that express-
ed on the record : yet no person would venture to assert
that simply because the record does not at all times ex-
press the actual amount due on the respective mortgages
it must therefore be charged with holding out a false
light to misguide and embarrass those who consult it,
and by so doing fail most signally in accomplishing the
purpose for which it was created.
"If the means of ascertaining the extent of the
lien are pointed out in the mortgage it is enough."
Allen vs Lathrop 46 Ga. 133.
IV. The most important remaining inquiry is in
regard to whether or not actual notice is necessary to
limit advances.
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It is a well settled principle of law that, when
the mortgagee has for a consideration undertaken to make,
and the mortgagor bound himself to accept, certain fu-
ture advances, such advances when made will relate back,
and the mortgage will be a good and valid security for
advances made and liabilities incurred against superven-
ing purchasers, creditors and incumbrancors having no-
tice of the prior mortgage.
Again, where there is no obligation between the
parties, and the making and acceptance of such advances
or liabilities are entirely optional, and the mortgagee
has actual notice of a subsequent conveyance or incumn-
brance of the mortgaged premises before making advances
or incurring liabilities, his security would not be good
as against such subsequent incutnbrancers.
But whether the senior mortgagee in a purely volun-
tary agreement, where the making and accepting of th
advances are entirely optional, shall hold the mortgaged
property as security for advances made after the making
and recording of the subsequent mortgage, is a much
mooted question in the courts of the various states
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indeed there is no question which has yet arisen on the
subject of future advances which has caused the same
amount of vexed discussion and been marked by such di-
versity of opinion as that bearing upon the legal suffi-
ciency of notice from a supervening incunbrancer or
creditor to a prior mortgagee in a purely optional agree-
ment for future advances.
Judge Redfield, in treating of the subject in a
veiy full and clear exposition of the principles -and
authorities, says : "The general view of the American
"uourts and uniform declaration of the English courts
"as far as we know, is, nothing short of notice in fact
"of the subsequent mortgage will have the effect of
"postponing advances made by the first mortgagee in favor
"of constructivenotice of the intervening security : it
"is expressed under various forms of language, but the
"result of the whole is that if the first mortgagee have
"knowledge of the existence of a second mortgage upon
"the estate, he cannot give further credit upon his
'prior mortgage, provided it is entirely optional with
"him whether to make further advances or not."
2 An. Law Rep. N. S. 19.
The same writer in a note to Boswell vs Goodwin,
Ain. Lar Rep. N. S, 92 ; favors the rule that a senior
mortgagee to secure future advances should be gcverned
by a constructive notice of a subsequent mortgage which
had been duly recorded, and that his priority of lien
would be of no avail for optional advances made after-
wards. The learned judge says : "e never have been
"able to coanprehend the hardship of requiring the prior
"mortgagee to secure future advances to take notice of
"the state of the registry at the time he makes the ad-
"vance."
There would be no questioning the reasonableness
of this doctrine in cases where the advances are to be
made at long intervals of time and in definite and
determinate sums. It is conceded that under such cir-
cumstances the prior mortgagee could have no just excuse
for failing to notice the state of the register, if the
law so required. But if, on the other hand, such ad-
vances were to be made daily or hourly, as is frequently
the case in continuous dealings wiGh bankers and brokers,
;he mortgagee would be compelled to keep a running ac-
counG which would be constantly changing its balance.
Under such circumstances the mortgagee ought to have
actual notice of a subsequent mortgage. The requirement
that one should constantly watch the register in such a
case, would either impose such an arduous duty and in-
convenience upon the mortgagee as to render it scarcely
less than a burdensome task, or it would tend to make
such continuing security of little avail.
As it is necessary to have a uniform rule govern-
ing both classes of cases, which would merit the approval
of business men, and at the same time coimnend itself to
their ideas of right and justice; no better can probably
be suggested than that which is sanctioned by the weight
of authority.
Every subsequent purchaser knows that he is compel-
led to consult the record at his peril, and having examin
ed it, he is immediately notified of -he preexisting
lien upon the property and therefore, he having such
notice, and the mortgagee being totally ignorant of the
contemplated purchase, why should not the subsequent
purchaser, who bargained with his eyes open as to the
claim of the mortgagee, be compelled to sustain any loss
that might arise from the foolishness of his act ?
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To a subsequent incumbrancer who advanced money on the
mortgaged property it might be said : you saw the
record of the prior mortgage and know what it was given
to secure ; you voluntarily advanced your money subject
to the prior incumbrance, and you cannot now be preferred
to any part of it. Ile would unquestionably in the
plainest equity be bound to give notice of such inter-
vening interest or suffer the consequences of his negli-
gence.
To make it imperative upon the senior mortgagee,
after he has duly recorded his mortgage, to make inqui-
"ries before he act's, lest he might perchance injure
some one, would be imposing the duty of notice and negli-
gence upon the wrong person, as it would be compelling
the prior mortgagee to perform a duty for the junior
mortgagee which the latter should in all fairness be
constrained to do for himself. It would be inequitable
to allow such subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer,
having notice of the record, to claim a preference over
the senior mortgagee, who has made endorsements or ad-
vanced moneys upon the faith of the mortgage, after the
second inci-nbrancer, in ignorance of the supervening
right or title.
The general principle of construction of the regis-
try laws upon the point of notice, is that the registra-
tion of incumbrances is notice to subsequent incumnbran-
cers only. Such notice is prospective not retrospective
in its operation.
Chancellor Greene in 7fard vs Cooke, 17 N. J. Equity
79 says : "A mortgage given to secure future advances,
"duly registered, is good not only as against the rnortga-
"gor, but is entitled to priority over subsequent incum-
"brances for all advances made prior to the notice of
"the subsequent incumbrance ; and the notice must be an
"actual and not a constructive notice."
In Shirras vs Caig 7 Cranch 51. The Supreme Court
of the United States held :"That a mortgage given for
"future advances was a security for all advances made
' "anti liabilities incurred upon its faith prior to' the
"receipt of actual notice of the subsequent title."
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There are a few general principles which, not hav-
ing a rlace under any particular head, will bear inci-
dental mention before closing this treatise on the
subject of future advances.
The validity of a mortgage to secure future advan-
ces is not in any way affected by the fact that such
advances were to be made in another commodity than money,
or that the advances are to be made to a third person
at the solicitation of the mortgagor.
Where a grantee purchases subject to a mortgage
for future advances, which the mortga,ee has bound him-
self to make, such mortgage will stand as a lien for
the amount agreed upon, even though the advances have
not been made at the time of the purchase.
It is now well settled in this state that any
debtor, whether solvent or insolvent, may, when acting
in good faith, mortgage a part or the whole of his pro-
perty as security for future loans or advances.
When a party by virtue of a mortgage obtains addi-
tional security for a preexisting debt, it is to be re-
garded as a valid consideration for his promise to
assume certain liabilities, and the agreement is not
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optional but compulsory on his part, because there is a
leg;al oblifgation on him to perform his ag!recment.
In reference to agreements for additional advances
made subsequent to the execution of the mortgage.-
Where the original agreement between the mortgagor
and mortgagee is in the form of an absolute deed, and
the conditional defeasance is made by parol, a subse-
quent agreement to the effect that the mortgagee should
make further advances or incur additional liabilities
on the same security, would be valid and binding as be-
tween the parties. But, should the instrument state
definitely the amount which it was given to secure, it
could not afterwards be construed to represent other
than the ainount to be stated. Under such circumstances
any subsequent agreement that the mortgage should stand
as security for a sum additional to that named, would be
invalid and of no binding force even as between the orig-
inal parties, because the mortgage being clear and ex-
plicit in its terms speaks for itself, and under no cir-
cumstances can the written evidence of one contract be
admitted as competent evidence to deny or contradict
another.
